t. 1. Materii︠a︡ i otrazhenie.--t. 2. Istina, poznanie, logika.

The meaning of the socialist revolution in our country, and its humanist significance, which was of the highest order, were expressed in the writings of V. I. Lenin with the clarity and insight of genius.

Der siegreiche Zug der technische Zivilisation zerstörte die Harmonie des Menschen und der Umwelt, änderte traditionelle Wertvorstellungen. Der "technische Intellekt" ist nicht befähigt, Konkrete Probleme der menschlichen Geschichte zu lösen. Unter dem Vorwand des Kampfes mit diesem "technischem Intellekt" verstärken sich in der modernen Welt irrationalistlische Tendenzen, welche die Vernunft und die menschliche Rationalität im allgemeinen angreifen. In dieser Situation wächst die Rolle der sozialen Erkenntnis, di dialektisch-materialistische Rationalität verkörpert.

The question of the role of science in the development of our society, and the role of the social sciences in particular, loomed large in the decisions of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU. This was a consequence of the tasks posed by the present stage of the building of communism. The proceedings and decisions of the Congress emphasized the rapid advance of science, its increasing influence upon all aspects of the material and intellectual life of society, and the need (...) to assure high rates of scientific and technological progress on the basis of the growth of all branches of knowledge and the extensive introduction of the achievements of science into industry. In the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Congress, considerable attention was given to the social sciences, upon which the party is now placing even greater responsibility. "The elaboration of important problems in economics and politics, philosophy and sociology, history and law, and in other social sciences, in close association with the practical work of the building of communism," said L. I. Brezhnev, "is a most important task for Soviet scholars." Further, he emphasized: "The development of the social sciences and the introduction of their recommendations in practice play no less important a role than the employment of the achievements of the natural sciences in the sphere of material production and the development of the intellectual life of the people" . These statements call for thorough consideration. (shrink)

In the modern world, in an epoch of fundamental changes in outdated social systems and the emergence of new societal relationships and develpments, an epoch of unprecedentedly rapid advances in science and technology — penetration into the depths of the atom and conquest of the cosmos — questions pertaining to art become of ever broader interest. In our rapidly changing world, art has become a powerful weapon in the struggle for the souls and minds of men. One can therefore welcome (...) the major topic of this congress, as selected by the Hegel Society: the fact that it is devoted to problems of Hegelian esthetics. (shrink)

Global processes and changes on a scale previously unknown, the strengthening of the power of world socialism, the class struggle and that for national liberation, the many phenomena, diverse in nature and consequences, of the revolution in science and technology in different socio-economic systems and their impact on the individual, the danger threatening civilization because of the arms race, the growth of means of extermination of human beings and the material conditions for their existence - all of these make the (...) rights of the individual a priority problem in the political and ideological life of our day. (shrink)

On Avicenna, 980-1037, a Muslim philosopher.

Ch. 1. Antropogenez -- ch. 2. Problema t︠s︡elesoobraznosti -- ch. 3. Dialektika kak geneticheskai︠a︡ logika.

Is arguing over ontology a mistake? A recent proposal by Karen Bennett suggests that some metaphysical disputes, such as those over constitution and composition, can be dismissed on epistemic grounds. Given that both sides in a dispute try to minimize the differences between them, there are no good metaphysical grounds for choosing between them. In this paper, I expand on her epistemic dismissivism, arguing that given the Quinean conception of the task and method of metaphysics, we are warranted in believing (...) that all ontological disputes will end in a draw, even if they have not yet done so. By a draw, I mean that while both sides in a dispute are genuinely disagreeing about what there is and there are still moves open to them, there are no moves remaining that will advance the discourse further. (shrink)

Purpose. The article is aimed to outline Locke’s position on the basic principles of proper human behavior. Its implementation involves: a) review of the research literature concerning the place of anthropological motive in philosophizing and b) research of his interpretation of human nature and the role of the rational component. Theoretical basis. The author’s approach is based on the conceptual provisions of phenomenology and existentialism. Originality. The work considers the teaching of Locke as the author of the original concept of (...) human nature, which is closely related to the understanding of ethical issues. It is proved that its meaningful development involves the identification of the main components of human nature in the process of determining the basic principles of personality behavior. The original conception of the thinker on the irrational component of human nature and the ways of its rationalization is analyzed. Conclusions. It is substantiated that Locke’s philosophical heritage is not reduced to depersonalized empiricism as epistemology, and his teaching about human is not limited to the abstract study of their rational component. The thinker connects the request of his own epoch with the new vision of human and the basic principles of their behavior on the basis of rationality. Locke is looking for the ways to master the irrational component of human nature and is convinced that in the era of the scientific revolution, the basis of human behavior should be rationality. Locke considers human freedom to be one of the key moments of human nature. (shrink)

THE question which I am to raise for discussion is one which has long been debated by philosophers, and consequently I consider it doubtful whether anything very new can be said on the matter. But it may be profitable to review once more the present position of the controversy and to have in mind the reasons which at present make the question of interest and of importance.

The subject of the present paper is the central conception of a philosophy that has been particularly dominant and influential, and the following remarks are prompted because of difficulties experienced in the attempt to understand that philosophy. The aim of the paper is to point out what seems to be a serious defect in that type of philosophy; but it is even more its aim to emphasize the danger into which philosophy in all its forms may easily fall, and against (...) which it must exercise precautions. (shrink)

The conceptual history of cognitive science remains for the most part unwritten. In this groundbreaking book, Jean-Pierre Dupuy--one of the principal architects of cognitive science in France--provides an important chapter: the legacy of cybernetics. Contrary to popular belief, Dupuy argues, cybernetics represented not the anthropomorphization of the machine but the mechanization of the human. The founding fathers of cybernetics--some of the greatest minds of the twentieth century, including John von Neumann, Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch, and Walter Pitts--intended to construct a (...) materialist and mechanistic science of mental behavior that would make it possible at last to resolve the ancient philosophical problem of mind and matter. The importance of cybernetics to cognitive science, Dupuy argues, lies not in its daring conception of the human mind in terms of the functioning of a machine but in the way the strengths and weaknesses of the cybernetics approach can illuminate controversies that rage today--between cognitivists and connectionists, eliminative materialists and Wittgensteinians, functionalists and anti-reductionists. Dupuy brings to life the intellectual excitement that attended the birth of cognitive science sixty years ago. He separates the promise of cybernetic ideas from the disappointment that followed as cybernetics was rejected and consigned to intellectual oblivion. The mechanization of the mind has reemerged today as an all-encompassing paradigm in the convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology, and cognitive science. The tensions, contradictions, paradoxes, and confusions Dupuy discerns in cybernetics offer a cautionary tale for future developments in cognitive science. (shrink)

I argue that, If one adopts a minimal naturalism (of a kind rejected by moore, Hare, "et al".), One would adopt a methodology which yields conclusions identical to that yielded by intuitionistic methodology (of a kind employed by ross, Prichard, "et al".). I dilate upon the advantages which thus accrue to each theory, And I defend my minimal naturalism against a variety of objections.

Emoji faces, which are ubiquitous in our everyday communication, are thought to resemble human faces and aid emotional communication. Yet, few studies examine whether emojis are perceived as a particular emotion and whether that perception changes based on rendering differences across electronic platforms. The current paper draws upon emotion theory to evaluate whether emoji faces depict anatomical differences that are proposed to differentiate human depictions of emotion. We modified the existing Facial Action Coding System to apply to emoji faces. An (...) equivalent “emoji FACS” rubric allowed us to evaluate two important questions: First, Anatomically, does the same emoji face “look” the same across platforms and versions? Second, Do emoji faces perceived as a particular emotion category resemble the proposed human facial expression for that emotion? To answer these questions, we compared the anatomically based codes for 31 emoji faces across three platforms and two version updates. We then compared those codes to the proposed human facial expression prototype for the emotion perceived within the emoji face. Overall, emoji faces across platforms and versions were not anatomically equivalent. Moreover, the majority of emoji faces did not conform to human facial expressions for an emotion, although the basic anatomical codes were shared among human and emoji faces. Some emotion categories were better predicted by the assortment of anatomical codes than others, with some individual differences among platforms. We discuss theories of emotion that help explain how emoji faces are perceived as an emotion, even when anatomical differences are not always consistent or specific to an emotion. (shrink)